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PROVOCATION-ASSAULT AND BATTERY AS SUFFICIENT
PROVOCATION TO REDUCE AN INTENTIONAL HOMICIDE
TO MANSLAUGHTER
No rule of law is more widely accepted and quoted in the criminal field than that an intentional killing resulting from heat of passion aroused in the killer by adequate legal provocation will be reduced to voluntary manslaughter.'
The rule, founded upon the
theory long entertained in the law, that there are certain provocations which arouse in man such rage or passion as to render him
"incapable of cool reflection 2 has been recognized since, and perhaps even before, the decision in the leading case of Regna v. Mawgrzdge 2 One such provocation, recognized equally as long as the doctrine itself, is an assault and battery by the deceased upon the
slayer.' Yet, despite long acceptance and frequent recitation, it appears that in many instances the patently simple rule that an assault and battery will be considered adequate provocation is quite
different in its application from what would be expected. It has been
held, for example, in one jurisdiction, that a jury was justified in
finding that a kick by the deceased upon the person of the defendant
did not constitute adequate provocation to reduce the offense to
manslaughter;' while in another it has been found that abusive
language followed by a wild shot, constituting no battery whatsoever, may be sufficient.' Obviously, such divergence of view results
in uncertainty and confusion in the law, as does any conflicting
construction of a given rule of law. It is the purpose of this note to
examine the degrees of violence said by various jurisdictions to
constitute the legal provocation of "assault and battery" and to
suggest the requirement which would appear best to serve society
today.
In order clearly to comprehend the import of the language
employed by the courts it is thought that a word concerning definition might prove helpful. Much confusion of the rule is needlessly caused by the loose manner in which many courts have used
"assault" as synonymous with "assault and battery." Clearly the
two are not synonymous and, being technical phrases, should be
employed separately. For purposes of this note, the common definitions are to be observed; thus an assault is considered an unlawful offer or attempt, coupled with an apparent present ability, to
McKaskle v. State, 96 Tex. Crim. Rep. 638, 260 S.W 588
(1924), Hannah v Commonwealth, 153 Va. 863, 149 S.E. 419 (1929)
See People v Ryczek, 224 Mich. 106, 194 N.W 609, 611 (1923)
-Holcomb
v State, 103 Tex. Crim. Rep. 352, 281 S.W 202
(1926).
2Kel.
J. 119, 84 Eng. Rep. 1107 (1707)
'Id. at 135, 84 Eng. Rep. at 1114.
'United States v Edmonds, 63 F Supp. 968 (1946).
'Roberson v. State, 217 Ala. 696, 117 So. 412 (1928).
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injure the person of another, which creates a reasonable apprehension of a battery A battery is considered to be "the unlawful
touching of the person of another by the aggressor himself or by
any substance put in motion by him."' Thus it is seen that, ordinarily, a "battery includes assault, but assault does not include battery.
When the assault culminates in a battery the offense is assault and
battery
"' Logically then, to apply these definitions to the
general rule that an assault and battery will constitute adequate
provocation, it would follow that any unlawful touching of the slayer
would constitute adequate provocation; and since even the slightest
touch in anger has been held to constitute an unlawful touching,0
that slight violence may be concluded sufficient if the rule be
strictly applied. Even the most hurried examination of the cases
applying the rule, however, is sufficient to show that such logic
has not been practiced by the courts.
One example of the strict application of the rule, however, is
in the case where words alone are sought to be introduced by way
of mitigation. This the courts have unanimously held insufficient,"
and necessarily so since they are equally of one voice in declaring
that words alone can never constitute an assault." It appears that
the same cannot be said in cases involving a mere assault unaccompanied by a battery for cases are to be found which at least use
language indicating that an assault alone may be sufficient provocation." It is, of course, the overwhelming majority rule that a homicide upon such provocation will not be mitigated.' The greatest
difficulty in drawing the line as to what shall constitute adequate
provocation appears to be encountered in situations involving a
slight or trivial assault and battery Here may be found all of the
elements to satisfy the general rule, when heat of passion is aroused
in a slayer by an action of the deceased which amounts technically
to an assault and battery though it be slight and harmless in result.
Historically, at common law, such an assault and battery would
undoubtedly have been adequate; for in Regna. v. Mawgridge" it
was said that "
pulling
by the nose, or filliping upon the
-Note, 33 Ky. L. J. 189 (1945). Many jurisdictions so define an
assault as to require actual present ability
sBALLENTINE, LAW DICTIONARY 142 (1930)
'Harris v State, 15 Okla. Cr. 369, 177 Pac. 122, 123 (1919)
'"Hunt v People, 53 Ill. App. 111 (1893), Crosswhite v Barnes,
139 Va. 471, 124 S.E. 242 (1924)
"People v Manzo, 9 Cal. 2d 594, 72 P 2d 119 (1937) People v.
Ortiz, 320 Ill. 205, 150 N.E. 708 (1926).
"Jenkins v Kentucky Hotel. 261 Ky 419, 87 S.W 2d 951
(1934) Johnson v Sampson et al., 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W 814
(1926)
"Roberson v State, 217 Ala. 696, 117 So. 412 (1928) Lamp v.
State, 37 Ga. App. 829, 142 S.E. 202 (1928) State v. Crawford, 66
W Va. 114, 66 S.E. 110 (1909).
"State v Biswell, 352 Mo. 698, 179 S.W 2d 61 (1944).
"Kel. J. 119, 84 Eng. Rep. 1107 (1707)
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'" would be sufficient. Similar language was quoted
forehead
with approval in two recent cases in Missouri which reaffirmed
the previously adopted "personal violence" rule.' A differing view,
however, has been taken m the recent case of United States v. Ednonds," which states that the law requires more than a "trivial"
assault and battery in order to reduce the offense. A number of
authorities may be cited in support of the latter view," and, while
it cannot be said with certainty what degree of violence many jurisdictions might require, there can be no doubt that a conflict exists.
This conflict raises the question of which is the most desirable
place to draw the line. In order to suggest an answer it is essential
to discuss the doctrine in the light of present-day needs. As has been
stated above, the rule is based upon the theory that men may at
times, become so provoked by certain situations as to render themselves "deaf to the voice of reason."' This is undoubtedly true; yet
the fact remains that not every killing which occurs during such a
fit of passion is mitigated to manslaughter. Clearly one might be
greatly provoked, possibly to the extent of taking life, by insulting
language, but the law will not recognize this as adequate provocation, = to cite only one example. Thus it is seen that an arbitrary line
is drawn at some point and certain provocations defined either as
adequate or inadequate. It is submitted that the question of where
the line should be drawn-whether to include as adequate words
alone, or any assault and battery, or only more serious batteries-is
a matter of public policy- for society must eventually decide upon
the standard of self-control which it is to require that its members
maintain at their peril.
The degrees of personal violence any of which might be arbitrarily selected as the lowest which the law will recognize as adequate to reduce an intentional killing to voluntary manslaughter
may be presented graphically on a scale running from that degree
involved in insulting language alone to that degree which gives rise
to the right of self defense. Thus the scale would appear as follows:

words
alone

I

assault

I

trivial
assault
and
battery

I

painful

battery

I

act causing
reasonable
fear of death
or great
bodily harm

I

'Id. at 135, 84 Eng. Rep. at 1114.
"State v. Biswell, 352 Mo. 698, 179 S.W 2d 61, 66 (1944), Stato
v. Bongard, 330 Mo. 805, 51 S.W 2d 84, 88 (1932)
"State v Starr, 38 Mo. 270 (1866).
" See note 5 supra.
" State v. Fisko, 58 Nev. 65, 70 P 2d 1113 (1937), Common
wealth v. Webb, 252 Pa. 187, 97 Atl. 189 .(1916) 2 BURDICK, THE LAW
OF CRIME sec. 462d (1946).

-State v. Honey, 22 Del. (6 Pennewill) 148, 65 Atl. 764 (Ct.
Oyer and Ter. 1906).
-

See note 11 supra.
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Clearly, under present holdings, words alone cannot be considered adequate; and since it is not believed to be in accord with the
trend in the law or in the best interest of society to afford increasing clemency in cases of homicide, it is thought that words alone as
provocation can be summarily dismissed. In the case of assault,
however, the same cannot be said, especially in those cases in which
the assault consists of a demonstration with a deadly weapon. For
here the arbitrary exclusion of the assault as adequate provocation
might appear to lead to a harsh result; and it is thought that this
fact has caused some courts to mitigate the assault and battery rule
so as to afford clemency in such cases. As has been stated, however,
the great majority of jurisdictions now hold a mere assault insufficient;' so that to deem that degree adaquate would be to relax the
policy of the law. Such a relaxation m this case is open to the same
objections as in the case of words alone. The Missouri court is
thought to have stated well the case against assaults as sufficient:
"It may seem illogical to say the insulting but
comparatively harmless jostling of a person on the
highway or a mere tweaking of the nose, may be sufficient to constitute lawful provocation, whereas a hostile demonstration with a deadly weapon threatening
imminent danger to life will not, though accompanied
by vile and insulting language. But the law cannot have
a rule exactly accomodating itself to the varied dispositions of people and altogether putting a premium on
turbulent tendencies.
For the proper administration
of justice some absolute standard of conduct is required.
Where the defendant believes, and has
reasonable ground for belief, that an impending assault
imminently threatens his life or great bodily harm, he
can act in self defense and be completely exculpated,
'though there be no battery. 2
If, then the extension of adequate provocation so as include
words alone or a mere assault be rejected, the problem of the degree of violence to be required may be simply stated: The law may
either (1) recognize any assault and battery as sufficient, or (2) require some specified degree of violence between a trivial assault
and battery and one which would give rise to the right of self
defense.
In the case of the first, the possibility of an absurd result has
already been mentioned in the extract from the Missouri case, supra.
It might result, for example, in the holding of an insignificant assault and battery sufficient while denying the adequacy of other
provocations just as enraging. In addition, it would seem that our
present-day society placing emphasis as it does, upon the value of
human life, should adopt a more stringent requirement in order that
homicides upon such trivial cause be discouraged. These objections.
'See note 14 supra.
' State v Bongard, 330 Mo. 805, -

51 S.W 2d 84, 89 (1932)
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-in the opinion of the writer, outweigh the obvious advantage of certainty which might be provided by an absolute rule that any assault
and battery is sufficient, if the jury find that heat of passion was in
fact present in a particular case.
Deciding, therefore, upon a more stringent rule, it becomes
necessary to determine the most desirable point at which to draw
the line and to formulate that rule so as to convey to the trial judge
:and to the jury the extent of the violence to be held adequate. It is
submitted that the lowest degree which would reduce the honucide
;should be a "painful" assault and battery; for does it not appear
more reasonable that the actual pain added to the insult of an as.sault should be much more likely to produce in man such heat of
passion as the law requires in order that a killing may be reduced?
Admittedly, this increases the burden of the jury which, if such a
rule should be adopted, might be charged with determining whether
,a battery might be classified as "painful." Yet, it is believed that
this would not be too difficult of application if it be understood that
no especial degree of pamn is required. Any "pain" would be sufficient to bring an assault and battery within the rule, which, while
hardly stringent enough in view of the discussion above, has the
valtle of a degree of certainty and of greatly decreasing the chances
that a mere jostling or tweaking of the nose might be held sufficient
provocation; for it is doubted that any jury would arrive at the
,conclusion that such slight batteries could be painful, if the ordinary
meaning of the word be preserved. Any other attempt, it is submitted, to formulate a more stringent rule fails to meet the test of
sufficient certainty. For example, if a "serious" battery, or one
"more than trivial" were required to mitigate a homicide rather
than a "painful" battery, it is feared that those phrases would admit of even more varied interpretations by trial judges and by juries
than would the word "painful."
It is therefore submitted, in conclusion, that the "assault and
battery" rule should be restated so as to require that an assault and
battery, in order to be adequate, should be a "painful" one, thus
amending the rule to hold- that an intentional killing resulting from
heat of passion aroused in the killer by a painful assault and battery
thereupon by the deceased would be reduced to voluntary manslaughter.
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